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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NO. 940543-CA 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
DOXEY-HATCH MEDICAL CENTER/ 
AMBER PETERSON, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, 
Division of Health Care 
Financing, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
DOXEY-HATCH MEDICAL CENTER/AMBER PETERSON 
* * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Petitioner's Brief and Respondent's Brief set forth the 
relevant facts in detail. However, Petitioner takes exception 
with a portion of Respondent's Statement of the Case where, at 
page 3, Respondent states that preadmission authorization to 
readmit Amber is "required by applicable federal and state 
Medicaid requirements." As pointed out in Petitioner's Brief at 
pages 15 and 18, there is no federal requirement that there be 
preadmission authorization upon a return to a nursing home from a 
hospital. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner almost totally ignores Petitioner's Brief wherein 
the argument is made that under the facts of the instant case the 
denial of reimbursement was unreasonable and irrational in this 
case. Rather, respondent simply states that Rule 455-9-6G 
required the filing of Form 10A upon return to the nursing home 
facility from a hospital stay in excess of three days. 
Respondent's Brief simply relies upon Rule 455-9-6G and the 
ruling in South Davis Community Hospital Inc./Romero v. 
Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing, 869 P.2d 
979 (Utah App. 1994) ("Romero") without giving any real analysis 
to the application of the ruling in that case to the facts of 
this case. Furthermore, Respondent states that because of the 
holding in Romero, Petitioner's appeal must be deemed to be 
frivolous and therefore subject to sanctions under Rule 33f Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. As shown by Petitioner's Brief and 
the Reply Brief, Respondent's Brief and position is wrong on all 
counts. 
POINT I 
PETITIONER'S APPEAL WAS NOT FRIVOLOUS 
Respondent claims that Doxey-Hatch raises precisely the same 
legal issue that was resolved in the Romero case, to-wit: 
"DHCF's discretion to interpret and authority to implement its 
utilization review procedures to avoid losing federal matching 
funds for Utah's Medicaid program" and "whether DHCF could 
reasonably deny Medicaid reimbursement to a provider/facility 
based on the facility's failure to comply with preadmission 
authorization requirements." (Respondent's Brief at page 14.) 
Based on Respondent's view that Romero has dealt with these 
issues in the past, Respondent argues that Petitioner's appeal is 
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frivolous and subject to sanctions pursuant to Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
However, Respondent fails to properly interpret the Romero 
case. In Romero. the court stated that, under the applicable 
standards for review, it must be determined whether DHCF exceeded 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. The facts of the 
instant case, as well demonstrated in Petitioner's Brief, are 
substantially different from those in the Romero case. The main 
difference is that in the Romero case, Romero had never gone 
through a preadmission screening procedure whereas in the instant 
case Amber Peterson had been prescreened and had been on Medicaid 
for at least two years prior to the period of time in issue. 
Additional facts pertaining to the unreasonableness of 
Respondent's position and differentiating this case from Romero 
are set forth in Petitioner's Brief. 
When the standard of review of DHCF's action is 
"reasonableness and rationality," as stated in Romero, each case 
is obviously very fact-specific. In other words, the question 
must be asked whether DHCF acted reasonably and rationally in 
this particular case based on these particular facts. 
Furthermore, Petitioner's Brief addresses additional issues 
not raised in Romero, to-wit: that DHCF's decision to deny 
reimbursement was inconsistent with prior rulings (page 20) and 
that the rule, when read literally, does not require the 
submission of a new Form 10A upon return to a nursing home from a 
hospital (page 22). Respondent has, for inexplicable reasons, 
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elected not to even address these arguments in its brief. Since 
these additional issues are not covered by Romero. this Appeal 
certainly cannot be frivolous. 
As shown by the above, and contrary to the assertions in 
Respondent's Brief (pages 14 and 15), there are reasonable legal 
and/or factual questions which this court has not previously 
determined in Romero. Consequently, this appeal is not 
frivolous. 
POINT II 
CONTRARY TO RESPONDENT'S ALLEGATIONS. 
DHCF'S DENIAL WAS NOT REASONABLE OR RATIONAL 
In Point II of its Brief, Respondent simply makes the 
argument that DHCF reasonably denied reimbursement and that there 
are no facts or circumstances that make it unreasonable for 
denying reimbursement. Respondent's Brief simply ignores, for 
the most part, all of Petitioner's facts and arguments regarding 
why the actions of DHCF were unreasonable and irrational. 
Respondent's argument is simply: (a) Rule R455-9-6G requires a 
new Form 10A upon return to the hospital after a three-day 
hospital stay; (b) no form was submitted; and (c) therefore, no 
reimbursement. 
Obviously, it is not appropriate for Petitioner to restate 
all of these facts and arguments in this Reply Brief. However, 
Petitioner strongly urges the Court to consider the facts, 
circumstances, and arguments set forth in Petitioner's Brief and, 
particularly, the facts that Amber was previously screened and 
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approved for Medicaid, had been on Medicaid for two years, had no 
change in her condition or treatment following her return from 
the hospital, Petitioner has had only a few instances in the past 
when it did not comply with the Form 10A requirement, that the 
failure to submit a new Form 10A was due to extenuating 
circumstances easily understandable by any reasonable person, 
that DHCF has acknowledged in correspondence that Petitioner has 
always been conscientious in doing its paper work and that it 
would like to grant relief, that in over 9 million Medicaid days 
in the last five years DHCF has granted relief in only two or 
three cases, and that DHCF has, in fact, adopted a new rule 
subsequent to the occurrence that is the subject matter of this 
case giving providers some leeway in submitting the Form 10A. 
All of these factors indicate that it would be reasonable and 
fair to allow reimbursement in this case and, on the other hand, 
to deny the same would be unreasonable. 
Beginning at page 9 of its Brief, Respondent gives an 
Overview of Utah's Medicaid and Utilization Review Programs. It 
quotes from Utah Code Ann. §26-18-2.3(1) to the effect that DHCF 
has been given the responsibility of implementing the Medicaid 
program "in an efficient, economical manner" and that DHCF shall 
establish a program to "safeguard against unnecessary or 
inappropriate use of Medicaid service, excessive payments, and 
unnecessary or inappropriate hospital admissions or lengths of 
stay." Respondent's Brief also quotes from §26-18-2.1 wherein it 
states that DHCF shall deny any claim for services that fail to 
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meet criteria established by DHCF "concerning medical necessity 
appropriateness." Concerning these two sections of the Code, it 
is obvious from the facts of the case that it was not necessary 
to deny reimbursement to Petitioner in order to "safeguard 
against unnecessary or inappropriate use of Medicaid services, 
excessive payments, or unnecessary or inappropriate hospital 
admissions or lengths of stay" because Amber was clearly 
certified for Medicaid and there is no question that her level of 
care and treatment was appropriate for her circumstances. There 
is no question, as required by §26-18-2.1, that Petitioner did 
meet the criteria established by DHCF for "medical necessity 
appropriateness." 
Respondent also quotes Utah Admin. Code Rule 455-9-6G which 
is the rule that requires a new Form 10A after a hospital stay of 
more than three days. However, as set forth at page 22 of 
Petitioner's Brief, that is not exactly what that rule provides. 
That rule states that "preadmission authorization will not be 
required for a hospital admission when the recipient returns to 
the original nursing care facility within three consecutive days 
. . . of admission to the hospital" [emphasis added]. Thus, this 
rule simply doesn't apply to this case because we are not talking 
about a preadmission authorization for a hospital admission. 
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POINT III 
RULE R455-9 EXCEEDS FEDERAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND IS UNREASONABLE 
In Point III of its Brief, Respondent tacitly acknowledges 
that Rule 455-9 is in excess of the requirements of federal law 
regarding preadmission screening. In this regard, see pages 15 
and 18 of Petitioner's Brief wherein the CCH Medicare and 
Medicaid Guide is quoted as stating that federal law does not 
require preadmission screening upon return to a nursing home 
facility from a hospital and that the preadmission screening 
requirement only applies to new admissions. Respondent simply 
relies upon the statutory language which gives DHCF the 
discretion to implement criteria to safeguard against unnecessary 
utilization of care and services by Medicaid providers. However, 
Respondent again conveniently ignores the fact that Amber was 
qualified for Medicaid for two years following an initial 
prescreening and subsequent utilization and need reviews, and 
that her level of care did not change after she returned to 
Doxey-Hatch from the hospital. In no way would Utah's Medicaid 
funds be jeopardized, as alleged by Respondent (pp. 13, 14), by 
eliminating or relaxing the rule on preadmission screenings or at 
least the timeliness of submitting Form 10A (as has been done as 
a matter of fact by the adoption of the new rule allowing 30 
"grace" days per year). Respondent also ignores the facts 
recited in Petitioner's Brief regarding the total number of 
Medicaid patients in Utah, the total number of Medicaid days in 
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Utah, and the fact that DHCF has only granted two or three 
exceptions to its strict rules in the past which, Petitioner 
argues, is proof in and of itself that these rules are unduly 
strict, unreasonable, and irrational. 
POINT IV 
DHCF'S DECISION IS ARBITRARY 
AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE 
IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH PRIOR 
CASES IN WHICH PAYMENT WAS ALLOWED 
As set forth beginning at page 20 of Petitioner's Brief, the 
Court should find that the decision by DHCF to deny payment is 
inconsistent with prior cases in which payment was made and is 
therefore arbitrary and capricious. Respondent's Brief does not 
address this issue because, presumably, Respondent knows that 
they have granted exceptions to this hard and fast rule in the 
past of requiring a Form 10A after a readmission from a hospital. 
Based on the prior exceptions and inconsistent rulings, DHCF's 
ruling should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, DHCF's decision denying Doxey-
Hatch Medicaid reimbursement for the period September 6, 1993 
through November 30, 1993 should be reversed. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT/PUBLISHED DECISION 
Because there are factual differences in the instant case 
from the Romero case, oral argument is requested. Furthermore, 
it is requested that the decision in this case be published. 
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Respectfully submitted this i* A day of April, 1995, 
/4 /W^ 
William L. Crawford 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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